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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3477 
______________ 
 
FREDERICK MUTUAL INSURANCE CO., 
 
         Appellant 
 
v. 
 
DONALD HALL, INDIVIDUALLY AND TRADING  
AS HALLSTONE, INC.; MARIA A. HALL,  
INDIVIDUALLY AND TRADING AS HALLSTONE, INC.; 
HALLSTONE, INC.; R. LEE HULKO; BRADLEY B. FAIR 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-03354) 
Honorable J. Curtis Joyner, District Judge  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 5, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  HARDIMAN, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: November 8, 2018) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
____________________ 
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Frederick Mutual Insurance Company (“Frederick”) has filed 
this appeal in a declaratory judgment action in which it sought to have the District Court 
declare that it did not have the duty to defend and indemnify Defendant-Appellee 
Hallstone, Inc. (“Hallstone”) under an insurance policy that Frederick issued to Hallstone 
in a state court action against Hallstone.  After holding a bench trial, the Court entered 
judgment for Hallstone, finding that the policy obligated Frederick to defend Hallstone in 
the state court action.  We will reverse. 
 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
We rely on the District Court’s findings of fact during its bench trial.  Defendant-
Appellees Donald and Marie Hall formed Hallstone to provide stone masonry work for 
residential premises.  On the advice of a builder, Donald Hall (“Hall”), a principal in 
Hallstone, approached the Fraser Insurance Agency (“Fraser”) to obtain an insurance 
policy to provide in Hall’s words “maximum,” “soup to nuts” coverage for Hallstone.  
Fraser obtained a liability policy from Frederick for Hallstone.  Hall and Frederick did 
not have direct contact and Hall never asked for or received a copy of the policy 
Frederick issued. 
Beginning in or around March 2006, Defendant-Appellees R. Lee Hulko and 
Bradley B. Fair (“the Customers”) contracted with Hallstone to provide custom stone 
masonry work for their home.  This project obviously was a substantial undertaking as it 
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took several years to complete and the Customers paid nearly $300,000 for the project.  
In April 2014, the Customers discovered that some of the stone masonry work that 
Hallstone had undertaken had been damaged and required substantial repairs ultimately 
costing $352,294.  The Customers attributed the damage to what they regarded was  
Hallstone’s substandard and defective work and consequently they filed a state court 
action in Pennsylvania against Hallstone alleging breach of warranty, negligence, and 
related statutory claims. 
While defending Hallstone in the state court action, Frederick filed this declaratory 
judgment action in the District Court, seeking a determination that it did not have a duty 
under its policy to defend and indemnify Hallstone for its defective workmanship.  
Frederick filed a motion for summary judgment but the Court denied the motion as it 
found that there was a question of fact on the question of whether Hall received a copy of 
the insurance policy from Frederick.  At the ensuing bench trial, the Court found that the 
insurance policy unambiguously excluded faulty workmanship coverage.  But the Court 
also found that Hall believed the policy provided coverage ‘“if something was done 
inadvertently’, or if his business did something and someone made a claim against his 
business that he might be liable for,” Frederick Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall, No. 15-3354, 2017 
WL 4883157, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2017), and that Frederick never provided Hall with 
a copy of the policy to contradict his belief.  Id. at *10.  The Court’s ultimate finding was 
that Hallstone had a reasonable expectation of workmanship coverage, and, accordingly, 
it entered judgment for Hallstone. 
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III.  DISCUSSION 
The District Court had diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the Court’s findings 
of fact for clear error, and review its conclusions of law de novo.  See Clientron Corp. v. 
Devon IT, Inc., 894 F.3d 568, 575-76 (3d Cir. 2018).  This matter is governed by 
Pennsylvania law. 
In reaching its decision, the District Court found that the insurance policy 
unambiguously excluded coverage for the faulty workmanship claims the Customers 
made in the underlying state court action, a conclusion with which we concur.  That 
finding should have been the end of the Court’s inquiry. 
It is well-settled that when policy language is unambiguous, we give effect 
to that language.  It is also well-settled that the focus of any inquiry 
regarding issues of coverage under an insurance policy is the reasonable 
expectations of the insured.  An insured, however, may not complain that 
its reasonable expectations have been frustrated when the applicable policy 
limitations are clear and unambiguous. 
 
Millers Capital Ins. Co. v. Gambone Bros. Dev. Co., 941 A.2d 706, 717 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007) (citations omitted).  “[G]enerally, courts cannot invoke the reasonable expectation 
doctrine to create an ambiguity where the policy itself is unambiguous.”  Matcon 
Diamond, Inc. v. Penn Nat’l Ins. Co., 815 A.2d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).  
Having found the policy unambiguous, the Court should have entered judgment for 
Frederick. 
 Nevertheless, the District Court, relying heavily on Tonkovic v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987), held that the facts of this case warranted the 
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application of the reasonable expectation doctrine.  In Tonkovic, an insured specifically 
had sought to obtain disability insurance from an insurance company that would cover his 
mortgage payments in the event he was disabled in an accident, even if he was entitled to 
workmen’s compensation benefits by reason of his injury.  Id. at 921.  Yet, 
notwithstanding the circumstance that he made his intentions clear to the insurance agent 
and in his insurance application, the company issued him a policy that excluded disability 
payments when workmen’s compensation was available to an insured as a result of an 
accident.  Id. at 922.  Although the agent contended Tonkovic had received a copy of the 
policy that unambiguously contained the exclusion, substantial evidence was presented at 
trial that he did not receive a copy of the policy.  Id.  Finding the company liable, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that there was 
a crucial distinction between cases where one applies for a specific type of 
coverage and the insurer unilaterally limits that coverage, resulting in a 
policy quite different from what the insured requested, and cases where the 
insured received precisely the coverage that he requested but failed to read 
the policy to discover clauses that are the usual incident of the coverage 
applied for.  When the insurer elects to issue a policy differing from what 
the insured requested and paid for, there is clearly a duty to advise the 
insured of the changes so made. The burden is not on the insured to read the 
policy to discover such changes, or not read it at his peril. 
 
Id. at 925. 
 In contrast, Hall did not apply for the specific type of insurance coverage he now 
claims that he expected as he asked in general terms for “soup to nuts” coverage though a 
broad term that was not specific.  Thus, Frederick could regard Hall’s application for 
insurance as seeking a general liability insurance policy. However, “[a] liability policy 
does not provide a guarantee of the policyholder’s workmanship.”  Standard Venetian 
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Blind Co. v. Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 567 (Pa. 1983) (Hutchinson, J., 
concurring).  “Such a guarantee is not within its coverage. I do not believe a businessman 
of ordinary intelligence could reasonably expect to obtain a defense against and 
indemnity for the cost of properly performing his contract or replacing his failed product 
under a liability policy.”  Id. (citing Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67 (3d 
Cir. 1983)). 
A businessman purchases a liability insurance policy to transfer the risk and 
cost of unexpected and unintended happenings (occurrences) to his 
insurance company.  The company agrees to assume that risk for a 
calculated premium.  The company does not, however, provide a guarantee 
of the businessman's workmanship or his products for that premium and 
typically protects itself against such claims by excluding coverage for 
property in the care, custody or control of the insured or property as to 
which the insured for any purpose is exercising control or by language . . . .  
There is usually some form of insurance available to cover injury to or 
destruction of the excluded property at a higher premium which is 
commensurate with the risk.  The exclusion is to eliminate securing the 
same coverage under a liability policy at cheaper rates. 
 
Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting F.D. Cooke, Jr., Care Custody or 
Control Exclusions, 1959 Ins. L.J. 7, 10, (1959).     
In Venetian Blind, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the insured’s 
argument that it neither was made aware of nor understood the exclusion of workmanship 
coverage from its policy, as it found that “the lack of knowledge or understanding of a 
clearly drafted exclusion clause in a written contract of insurance executed by both 
parties does not render the clause unenforceable.”  Id. at 564.  Although Hall argues that 
he never received a copy of the policy, a contention that we accept, and therefore he was 
unaware of the exclusion, this circumstance does not change the fact that he was seeking 
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general liability insurance.  At no point did he specify that he desired the more costly 
workmanship insurance.  As the court held in Matcon, an insured’s failure to request or 
bargain for a particular coverage precludes a court from finding that the insured expected 
such coverage, whether or not the insured received a copy of the policy.  815 A.2d at 
1115. 
 Even if we agreed with the District Court’s invocation of the reasonable 
expectation doctrine, Pennsylvania case law makes clear that the Court’s application of 
the doctrine was flawed.  As we have held under Pennsylvania law, “[o]nly objectively 
reasonable expectations are protected[.]”  Selected Risk, 718 F.2d at 71.  Hall’s claim that 
he expected Hallstone’s “maximum,” “soup to nuts” liability policy to include 
workmanship coverage is no more reasonable than if a purchaser of auto insurance 
expected his policy to cover repairs if his car breaks down, even if he asked for “soup to 
nuts” coverage.  See id. (holding that the insured was not reasonable to expect his basic 
homeowner’s insurance policy to provide coverage for intentional criminal acts).  It is 
simply not the kind of coverage insurance agents and insurance companies expect to 
provide unless the insured explicitly requests such coverage. 
If we were to allow an insured to override the plain language of a policy 
limitation anytime he or she was dissatisfied with the limitation by simply 
invoking the reasonable expectations doctrine, the language of insurance 
policies would cease to have meaning and, as a consequence, insurers 
would be unable to project risk.  The inability to project risk would 
dissuade insurers from doing business in the Commonwealth and the net 
result would be an increase in premiums for consumers.  We refuse to set 
such a deleterious sequence of events into motion. 
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Millers, 941 A.2d at 717-18.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment 
entered on October 30, 2017, for Hallstone, and will remand the matter to that Court to 
enter judgment for Frederick.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2106. 
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